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Harvey: Contracts and Sales

CONTRACTS AND SALES
W.

3RANTLEY HARVEY, JR.*
CONTRACTS

The case of Crown Central Petroleum Corporationv. Port
Oil Co.1 arises out of dispute over a series of agreements
whereunder Port Oil Co. agreed to purchase all of its petroleum including a guaranteed minimum from Crown, and
leased to Crown certain filling stations which were in turn
leased-back to Port with the reservation that the leaseback
would be cancelled upon the abrogation by Port Oil Company
of the distributor agreement. In the lower court Crown alleged that Port had defaulted in the distributor agreement
and Crown sought cancellation of the leaseback agreement
and possession of the service stations. The lower court found
that Crown had violated an oral agreement to assist Port Oil
Company in building additional service stations and that
Port Oil Company was therefore justified in ceasing to act
as distributor and Crown was procluded from cancelling the
leasebacks and re-possessing the stations. The Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's finding on the oral contract stating that the terms of this alleged contract were so
vague as to the size, number, locations, date of construction
and expense of the service stations to be erected that it could
not be said that there was in fact a contract. The case was
remanded to the district court to determine whether it ought
to enforce or lift forfeiture provision of the leaseback agreement, the court pointing out the contractual provisions for
forfeiture are looked upon with disfavor and will not be
enforced if the result of the forfeiture will be unconscionable.
The defense of lack of mutually between the contracting
parties and the Statute of Frauds was raised by the appellant
in Noland Company v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Company.2 The action was originally brought in the United
States District Court by a general contractor against a
subcontractor, Noland, for the difference between Noland's
bid price to supply an elevated water tank and Ruscon's
actual cost of supplying the tank after the bid was not com*Member of firm, Harvey and Harvey, Beaufort, S. C.
1. 301 F. 2d 175 (4th Cir. 1962).
2. 301 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962).
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plied with. Noland filed a third party complaint against its
supplier, Graver, and the lower court found for the contractor
as against Noland and Noland was awarded the same amount
from the third party defendant, Graver. The bid price on
an elevated water tank was quoted by Graver over the telephone to the subcontractor Noland who passed it on to the
contractor. After the bid was accepted it was discovered that
the price quoted was for a smaller tank and both of the parties
before the Court of Appeals failed to plead the contract.
The appellant contends that the price quoted on the water
tank was so low that it should have been apparent that a
mistake was made and that an offer based on an obvious mistake can not be accepted. The court accepted this principal
and sustained the lower court's finding of fact that the mistake
was not obvious to the offeree. The court went on to quote
the two principles of contract law that a unilateral mistake
does not render the transaction voidable by the party making
the mistake; and an offer is judged by its objective manifestations not by any mental reservations or intentions of the
offeror.
The appellant further argued that the South Carolina
Statute of Frauds 3 prevents enforcement of oral contracts
for the sale of goods of the value of $50.00 or more. The
court quoted from the South Carolina case of Wallace v.
DoWling 4 where the goods contracted for have to be made
or something be done to put it in a condition to be delivered
according to the terms of the contract, that it is not within
the Statute of Frauds. The appellant's contention was rejected
since in this case the water tank had to be erected and assembled.
The case of Black v. Gettys5 is concerned primarily with the
interpretation of a will and the trust thereby created. However, it was also called upon to decide the enforceability of
a "stock option contract" signed by the widow under seal
wherein she agreed upon the death of her husband to transfer
certain bank stock to a named trustee. The widow's uncontradicted testimony was that she received no actual consideration to sign this contract and the Court held that she should
not be required to perform her agreement to deliver this stock.
3. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 11-103 (1962).
4. 86 S. C. 307, 68 S. E. 571 (1910).
5. 238 S. C. 167, 119 S. E. 2d 660 (1961).
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The general rule is that one is not allowed, in the absence
of fraud, to show that an instrument signed under seal was.
without consideration, since the seal of itself imports a.
consideration. However, in an action for specific performance.
equity will never enforce an agreement unless there was an
actual valuable consideration. Unlike the common law, equitydoes not permit a seal to supply the place of real consideration.
Where the language of a contract of insurance, as with
other contracts, is free from ambiguity it must be construed
according to the terms which the parties have used, to be
taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular
sense and such construction is for the Court. On this fundamental point of the law of contracts the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and ordered judgment
entered for the appellant-insurer in the case of Rhame v.
National Grange Mutual Insurance Co.6 The plaintiff could
not recover medical expenses for his injured employees under
his policy since it specifically excluded such benefits.
Fraudulent Breach of Contracts
The soundness of the general rule that one who seeks to
avoid the effect of a release of a claim under an insurance
policy must first return or tender the consideration paid for
the release, was considered in the case of Dunaway v. United
Insurance Company of America.7 The lower court directed a
verdict for the defendant insurance company because of the
failure of the plaintiff to return or offer to return the money
received by him for the execution of a release and a hospitalL
ization insurance policy claim which release the plaintiff now
claims was fraudulently obtained from him. The appellant's.
contention before the Supreme Court was that he was seekingto recover in tort for the fraud and not in contract, therefore
a return of the consideration is not required. This rational&
has been followed in some other jurisdictions, 8 however the,
Supreme Court held that the present action was one ex
contractu since the plaintiff had "elected to go to trial upon
fraudulent breach of contract."
After having refused appellant's contention that he was
seeking to recover in tort the Court stated that it was not
6.
7.
8.
76 C.

238 S. C. 539, 121 S. E. 2d 94 (1961).
239 S. C. 407, 123 S. E. 2d 353 (1962).
Annot. 134 A. L. R. 6 (1941) ; 45 AM. Jur. RELpASE, § 53 (1943)
J. S. RELFASE, § 34 (1952).
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passing upon the question of whether an action correctly
brought in tort for fraud and deceit could be maintained
without returning the consideration for the release. However,
the red flag is definitely raised for the practitioner by the
citation of the case of Taylor v. Palmetto State Life Insurance
Company. In the Taylor case the court said the rule that the
party seeking to avoid a release must remit the funds received
therefor applied to actions ex contractu as well as actions ex
delicto.
It appears to this writer that even where an action is
brought ex contractu seeking to set aside a release fraudulently obtained, that harsh results are being reached by the
technical requirement that a return of the consideration paid
therefor must be first made. Would not the same results be
accomplished if the plaintiff were simply permitted to acknowledge receipt of a sum under the alleged fraudulent
settlement in his pleading and then if he prevails, this be
applied on the verdict or judgment ultimately received?
It also appears to this writer that to deprive a person of
his rights under a contract by obtaining its cancellation
through fraud and deceit gives rise to an action in tort just
as surely as if one party to a contract tried to deny the other
party of his rights and benefits under a contract by running
him down with an automobile. Why should an action for
fraud and deceit require return of the consideration as indicated in -the Taylor casej when this is the very thing sued
upon?
Contract of Employment
The case of Oxman v. Sherman 0 arose out of an attempt
to enforce three restrictive covenants in a contract of employment:
1. Employee would not engage in the competitive business
of selling health, accident and life insurance in the State of
South Carolina within one year after the termination of his
employment as the plaintiff's agent.
2. Employee would not induce any of his employer's personnel to terminate their employment.
3. Employee would not induce any policyholder to cancel
or terminate his insurance in force with the employer.
9. 196 S. C. 195, 12 S. E. 2d 708 (1940).
10. 239 S. C. 218, 122 S. E. 2d 559 (1961).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/7

4

Harvey: Contracts and Sales
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

The defendant (employee) contends that the covenants
are void as against public policy. The Court states that
covenants not to compete in a contract of employment are
looked upon with disfavor and will be strictly construed
against the employer and then reviews the criteria such
covenants must meet if they are to be enforceable. 1
The covenant not to compete was held to have expired since
the employee ceased acting as an insurance agent for employer
more than one year before the action, although he remained
with the employer in a supervisory capacity.
Further, the extension of the restriction to cover the entire
State, when employee only worked for the employer in two
counties, renders it unenforceable.
The second covenant is reasonable since it does not prevent
the employee after leaving the services of his employer from
seeking to hire his former fellow-employees; but merely prohibits him from maliciously inducing another to breach his
contract, which right is recognized at common law.
The third covenant was held to be valid.
SALES
In the case of Clanton's Auto Auction Sales Inc. v. Harvin
and Stevenson Finance Company,12 the plaintiff sold the
defendant Harvin, an automobile dealer, an automobile and
by oral agreement held the title pending receipt of Harvin's
check in payment. Harvin mortgaged the auto to Stevenson
which instrument was recorded. The plaintiff now brings
claim and delivery on the theory that its retention of all
indicia of title placed all others on notice that Harvin did not
have title and they dealt with him at their peril. The Court
in affirming the lower court's order for the defendants held
that under the provisions of the South Carolina Bailment
Statute13 a reservation of title by a vendor must be in writing
and recorded in order to effect the rights of a subsequent
creditor. Under the South Carolina Vehicle Title Law1 4 the
11. See Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S. C. 313, 104 S. E. 2d 388 (1958)
and Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S. C. 54, 119 S. E. 2d 533
(1961) reviewed in 14 S. C. L. Q. 16 (1961).
12. 238 S. C. 237, 120 S. E. 2d 237 (1961).
13. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 57-308 (1952).
14. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-139.53 and 46-139.81(3)
(1952).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

5

19621

SURVEY
OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 7

defendant Harvin, being a dealer, was not required to produce
the title certificate.
The almost identical question as that in the Clanton case
above was presented to the court in the case of Ex ParteDort
In Re: Stevenson Finance Company v. Wingard.15 The appellant Dort sold Wingard, an automobile dealer, withholding
the certificate of title and bill of sale pending clearance of
Wingard's check. Wingard thereafter immediately mortgaged
the automobile to Stevenson Finance Company. This transaction took place in December, 1958, and the Court held that
the Motor Vehicle Title Law' 6 did not apply since it was not
enacted until 1959. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision in favor of Stevenson, the mortgagee, basing
its opinion upon the Bailment Statute which requires that
the reservation of interest in property be reduced to writing
and recorded and upon the principles that one in possession
of personal property is presumed to be the owner. The Court
also recognized that its decision followed the rule that if
one of two innocent persons must suffer from the fraud of
another then the one whose negligence made the fraud possible must bear the loss.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporationv. Platt17 was an action
for deficiency judgment upon a conditional sales contract upon
a truck after the truck had been voluntarily delivered to the
plaintiff and sold at public auction. There was a conflict in
the testimony of the witnesses and the court's judgment n.o.v.
for the plaintiff was based upon its view of the credibility and
probative value of the evidence. This case adds nothing to
the body of law on the subject of sales.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In the case of Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc.'8 plaintiff
sued the defendant automobile dealer for fraudulently misrepresenting the mileage and condition of the used automobile
sold to him. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant salesman
told him that the car had only about 16,000 miles on it and the
speedometer read only approximately 16,000 miles, when in
fact the automobile had been driven more than 55,000 miles.
15. 238 S. C. 506, 121 S. E. 2d 1 (1961).

16. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-138 as amended (1952).

17. 239 S. C. 103, 121 S. E. 2d 351 (1961).

18. 240 S. C. 26, 124 S. E. 2d 585 (1962).
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The defendant contends that there was failure of proof of
one of the essential elements of fraud, that is that the salesman had knowledge of the falsity of his representations as to
the mileage and condition of the car. The Court held that it
was not necessary to prove that the person making the
allegedly false representations had actual knowledge of its
falsity, but that if he makes it as of his personal knowledge,
with reckless disregard of his lack of information as to its
truth, his knowledge of its falsity is legally inferable. The
Court also recognized the well known rule that one will not
be allowed to recover if by his own negligence and failure to
avail himself of information easily within his reach he has
contributed to the perpetration of the alleged fraud; holding
in this case that there was no such failure on the part of the
purchaser who had no reason to doubt the truth of the statements at the time of the sale. Judgment of the lower court
for the plaintiff was affirmed.
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